Wolf: Putin is Bad For Russia
Not exactly breaking news here. And delving into the economic numbers isn’t exactly necessary to indict Putin. But more data is always useful, so here goes. There is more, and if you have an FT subscription it is worth reading, but I don’t want FT getting mad at me for reproducing in full:
Why Putin’s rule threatens both Russia and the west
By Martin Wolf
Published: February 12 2008 18:34 | Last updated: February 12 2008 18:34
At least he made the trains run on time. That was said of Benito Mussolini, Italy’s fascist dictator from 1922 to 1943. Much the same is now said of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s authoritarian president. He may have crushed the fragile shoots of democracy, but he has at least restored the economy, the state and his country’s place in the world.
This view is shared by Mr Putin himself. He stated only last week that: “We have worked to restore the country after the chaos, economic ruin and breakdown of the old system that we saw in the 1990s.” But it suffers from a drawback: it is false, as Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss of Stanford University argue in a powerful article*.
True, between 1999, the year before Mr Putin became president, and 2007, the Russian economy expanded by 69 per cent. But the economies of 11 of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union expanded by more than Russia’s. Indeed, only Kyrgyzstan did markedly worse.
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It is simply wrong to assign credit for the upswing to Mr Putin. Not only did it begin with the devaluation of 1998, but nearly all the reforms that underlay the improvement were initiated, if not brought to fruition, under Boris Yeltsin’s despised rule. Under Mr Putin little progress has been made on structural reforms. That is one of the central points made by Anders Aslund, a distinguished scholar, in a superb new book**.
In important respects economic reform has gone backwards, particularly with the ever-growing role of the state in vital segments of the economy. This reversal is directly related to the second false claim about Mr Putin, that he has restored the state. This is true only if one accepts his definition of a strong state: a behemoth subject neither to law nor to political competition.
Mr Putin has eliminated all independence in television and most of it in the press; he has destroyed the autonomy of regional government; he has emasculated parliament; and he has eliminated competition for power. The political divergence between Ukraine, increasingly free, and Russia, increasingly despotic, is as clear as it is disturbing.
The result is not an effective state, but an overweening one. Corruption is rife. Mr Putin himself tells us so: “The state system is weighed down by bureaucracy and corruption and does not have the motivation for positive change, much less dynamic development.” But this is inevitable when so much unaccountable power is concentrated in one person’s hands. By destroying independent institutions, the state has mutilated itself: it is a blind and crippled giant.
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In place of erstwhile hopes for the emergence of a pro-western Russian democracy, we have proto-fascism: aggrieved nationalism; bullying of smaller nations; a cult of the strong leader; suspicion of enemies within; and resentment of foreigners.
Yet Russia is also a nuclear-armed state with vast energy resources. That makes this development worrying, as well as depressing. Russia has chosen the statecraft of fear over the promise of freedom. No doubt, mistakes by the west helped bring this about. I agree with Mr Aslund that the biggest error was the decision to focus on the ridiculously insignificant issue of post-Soviet debt, in late 1991 and early 1992, instead of the challenge of assisting the political and economic transition. But this is now history. It was, in any case, the decision of Mr Putin and associates to turn Russia from the aspiration for a law-governed democracy towards autocracy.
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*The Myth of the Authoritarian Model, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008; **Russia’s Capitalist Revolution (Peterson Institute for International Economics), 2007; ***The New Cold War (Bloomsbury), 2008
